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Abstract
This paper studies an endogenous growth model with human capital,
exhaustible resources, and overlapping generations. Under laissez-faire,
higher study time reduces depletion rates by increasing the share of re-
sources that present generations are willing to sell to successors. However,
sel￿sh behavior may prevent competitive sustained growth, and implement-
ing utilitarian allocations generally induces optimal-and-sustainable paths.
It is shown that: (i) raising study time and decreasing resource depletion
are always complementary targets in optimal policies; (ii) growth e⁄ects
are stronger the lower the optimal share of exploited resources; (iii) gener-
ational welfare gains from optimal policies are delayed by faster depletion
and, contrary to intuition, anticipated by lower social discount rates.
Keywords Endogenous Growth, Exhaustible Resources, Human Capital, Over-
lapping Generations, Intergenerational Fairness, Sustainability.






Overcoming the constraints set by depletable essential inputs, such as oil, is a
major challenge facing modern economies. When production possibilities are
limited by resource scarcity, achieving sustained economic growth is a matter
of both technological development and intertemporal distribution of resources.
Non-declining welfare typically requires that production possibilities are being
enhanced over time by some form of technical change. But the ability to pro-
duce a constant ￿ ow of output does not su¢ ce ensuring that future generations￿
welfare is preserved: the accumulation process of the various productive stocks is
determined by intertemporal rules that may, or may not be compatible with in-
tergenerational fairness. The modern literature on the sustainability of economic
growth has been confronted with this two-sided problem since the seminal works
of Dasgupta and Heal (1974) and Solow (1974), and the same dichotomy can still
be found in the approaches followed by recent contributions on sustainability.1
A ￿rst strand of literature focuses on the role of technological change, and
I will label it as ￿ sustained growth literature￿ . Following the main insights of
Stiglitz (1974), several contributions reformulated the problem of obtaining non-
declining consumption in the context of endogenous growth theories. In the
new framework, the conditions for achieving positive growth rates are intimately
linked to the development of innovations and the pro￿tability of R&D investment
(Barbier, 1999; Sholz and Ziemes, 1999; Groth and Schou, 2002; Grimaud and
RougØ, 2003). When production is heavily dependent on the use of exhaustible
resources, endogenous technical progress may guarantee sustained consumption
in the long run: the general condition is that the rate of resource-augmenting
technical progress must not fall below the utility discount rate.2 This result clearly
hinges on the validity of the Keynes-Ramsey rule. Indeed, these contributions
assume that saving decisions are taken by utility-maximizing consumers with
in￿nite lifetimes, and intertemporal allocations are biased in favor of early-in-
time consumption due to discounting.
A parallel body of contributions, which I label as ￿ sustainable development lit-
erature￿ , analyzes the conditions for preserving the welfare of future generations
1In the neoclassical growth model, it is possible to produce a constant ￿ ow of output if
the relative production share of reproducible capital goods is greater than that of exhaustible
natural inputs (Solow, 1974). However, if savings are governed by the Keynes-Ramsey rule,
consumption per capita must decline in the long run for any positive discount rate (Dasgupta
and Heal, 1974).
2This result holds even in the presence of poor substitution possibilities between natural
capital and other inputs (Bretschger and Smulders, 2006), but requires that technical change
be, implicitly or explicitly, of the resource-augmenting type (Di Maria and Valente, 2006).
2assuming explicit demographic structures - in particular, overlapping generations
models with sel￿sh agents.3 These contributions emphasized the fact that inter-
generational equity and intertemporal e¢ ciency are distinct objectives (Howarth
and Norgaard, 1992; Mourmouras, 1993): once that welfare criteria incorporate
fairness concerns, e¢ ciency per se does not guarantee socially optimal outcomes,
and achieving the social optimum generally requires a system of transfers that
redistributes income among generations (Gerlagh and Keyzer, 2001; 2003).
The idea that sustainable development is a matter of intergenerational equity,
rather than of technological feasibility, is the main conceptual di⁄erence between
the two strands of literature described above. The distinction is further empha-
sized at the formal level: most contributions studying endogenous growth models
do not consider explicit demographic structures, while overlapping generations
models generally neglect endogenous growth mechanisms. However, merging the
two frameworks is desirable from the perspective of both positive and normative
analysis, since assuming in￿nitely-lived agents prevents any systematic study of
the links between the source of endogenous growth and the intergenerational dis-
tribution of resources. Building on this general idea, this paper tackles the speci￿c
issues of (i) the interactions between equilibrium rates of resource use and hu-
man capital accumulation in both laissez-faire and optimized economies, and (ii)
the way in which these interactions a⁄ect the intergenerational distribution of
bene￿ts.
From a theoretical perspective, the reason for addressing these issues is twofold.
A ￿rst point regards the role of human capital formation in relieving the con-
straints imposed by resource scarcity. Di⁄erently from resource-augmenting tech-
nical progress - i.e. innovations that are expressly designed to raise the produc-
tivity of natural resources (Amigues et al. 2004; Di Maria and Valente, 2006) -
increasing the rate of human capital accumulation may have non-trivial e⁄ects,
since higher study time tends to crowd-out individual private wealth. The net
e⁄ect of increased knowledge formation on the share of natural resources that is
being given to subsequent generations is not clear a priori, as it depends on the
nature of intertemporal trade relations. In this regard, we will assume a world
of sel￿sh agents, where resources are sold to successors only to the extent that
preservation is pro￿table to those currently alive.
3The Brundtland Energy Report (WCED, 1987) de￿ned sustainable development as de-
velopment that meets the needs of the present, without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs. In formal economic models, this de￿nition has been trans-
lated in terms of conditions requiring that (i) the utility level achieved by each generation not
exceed the maximum level of utility that can be sustained forever by the economy, or (ii) the
level of utility of each generation be at least equal to that enjoyed by the previous generation
(see Pezzey, 1992).
3A second question regards the role of present-value optimality and social dis-
counting in centrally-planned allocations. Models with in￿nitely-lived agents tend
to support the view that discounting harms prospects for sustainability, since a
high rate of time preference may yield negative growth rates in the long run.
The reasoning is quite di⁄erent in an overlapping-generations setting where be-
quests are not operative. Imposing intergenerational discounting in these models
introduces a minimal concern for fairness in the criterion of social optimality:
the resulting allocations are still biased in favor of early-in-time consumption,
but late-in-time generations receive bene￿ts with respect to sel￿sh laissez-faire.
The literature on this issue emphasized this point in the general context of com-
plete markets - an early reference is Howarth and Norgaard (1993) - but little
attention has been given to situations in which the problem of allocating scarce
resources among sel￿sh agents is combined with intergenerational externalities
induced by human capital. This point is relevant, however, since the inclusion
of dynamic spillovers reshapes optimal allocations, modi￿es the design of inter-
generational transfers, and obviously a⁄ects the intergenerational distribution of
welfare gains from optimal policies. The coexistence of intergenerational exter-
nalities and exhaustible resources is the central feature of the present analysis:
when human capital accumulation is sustained by knowledge spillovers, redistrib-
ution becomes desirable even from a purely utilitarian point of view. In general,
this implies that redistributing toward future generations is optimal, but, as we
show, does not necessarily mean that resource depletion rates will be lower than
under laissez-faire. Moreover, since redistribution also implies ￿ level e⁄ects￿on
output, another relevant issue regards the welfare consequences of the interaction
between human and natural capital for the di⁄erent generations involved.
Beyond the theoretical issues, studying these interactions is also relevant from
an empirical perspective. Applied studies by Gylfason (2001), Bravo-Ortega and
De Gregorio (2005), and Stijns (2006), suggest that human capital formation has
been a key determinant of the economic performance of many resource-dependent
countries. Great abundance of non-renewable natural inputs, such as oil, is asso-
ciated with stagnation in countries where human capital is relatively low, whereas
sustained growth is observed in economies where workers are well-endowed with
education and skills. In particular, Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio (2005) study
the relative performance of Scandinavian and Latin American economies, ￿nding
a signi￿cant ￿ interaction term￿between human capital and resource exploitation.
In secion 2 we study a simple endogenous growth model where individual
knowledge is positively a⁄ected by the average human capital of previous gener-
ations, and can be raised by means of education. The natural stock represents
aggregate private wealth, and can be either sold to successors or employed in
4production. It is shown that, in the laissez-faire economy, the higher is study
time, the higher is the share of resources that adult agents are willing to sell to
future generations - and, symmetrically, the lower is the share of natural capital
sold to ￿rms for production purposes. However, sel￿sh behavior may prevent
sustained growth under laissez-faire. In the command optimum, the speed at
which natural capital declines over time is negatively correlated with the rate
of human capital accumulation, through the social discount rate. This implies
that human capital accumulation and resource preservation are always comple-
mentary targets in optimal policies: although knowledge spillovers are the only
externality, resource entitlements must also be reallocated across generations in
order to implement the social optimum. Depending on the level of the discount
rate, optimal allocations exhibit di⁄erent characteristics: with heavy discount-
ing, they are knowledge-improving but imply faster depletion rates relative to
the laissez-faire equilibrium; when the social discount rate falls below a criti-
cal threshold, instead, the optimal allocation displays higher study time and re-
duced rates of resource use. As shown in section 3, both strategies are generally
growth-enhancing, and bring the economy toward optimal and sustainable paths,
but welfare implications di⁄er: when optimal are resource-saving, growth e⁄ects
are stronger and contrast negative level e⁄ects induced by redistribution. This
￿ welfare-compensation mechanism￿ , not observable in models with in￿nitely-lived
agents, implies that early-in-time generations enjoy positive welfare gains from
optimal allocations especially when the associated policy is resource-preserving
- i.e. characterized by low discount rates. Conversely, the achievement of posi-
tive net bene￿ts may be delayed substantially by high discount rates: the reason
for this counter-intuitive result is that heavy social discounting implies resource-
depleting optimal policies. Section 4 summarizes the conclusions, and suggests
two possible extensions of the present analysis.
2 The model
We assume that positive production requires natural capital, in addition to hu-
man capital. Di⁄erently from the ￿ sustained growth literature￿ , which postulates
that the engine of growth is technological progress driven by R&D activity, eco-
nomic development is here induced by intergenerational spillovers that sustain
human capital accumulation (Uzawa, 1965; Lucas, 1988). The model can thus
be considered an extension of the Uzawa-Lucas framework (e.g. Azariadis and
Drazen, 1990; Docquier and Michel, 1999) to include exhaustible resources; or,
symmetrically, an extension of the labor-resource model with overlapping gener-
ations (Mourmouras, 1993; Krautkraemer and Batina, 1999; Valente, 2007) to
5include human capital formation.4
For simplicity, we assume zero net fertility rates: in each period t, the economy
is populated by n young and n adult individuals. Lifetime utility of an agent born
at the beginning of period t depends on individual consumption when young, ct,
and when adult, et+1, with preferences
Vt = logct + ￿ loget+1; (1)
where ￿ 2 (0;1) is the private discount factor. In line with recent literature, a
sustainable path is de￿ned as path along which lifetime utility is non-declining
over time - that is, Vt+1 (ct+1;et+2) ￿ Vt (ct;et+1). In period t, there are n young
and n adult individuals, and each young agents inherits own knowledge from the
current state of the economy. Knowledge is represented by ￿ h, measured in terms
of labor-e¢ ciency units. Individuals are endowed with one unit of time: in the
￿rst period of life, a fraction (1 ￿ ‘t) is devoted to study, and ‘t￿ ht are supplied for
production. In the second period, individuals only work, and consume all their
income. The level of labor e¢ ciency achieved at the beginning of the second
period of life depends on study time, according to the learning technology
￿ ht+1 = ’t￿ ht; ’t =   (1 ￿ ‘t)
" ; (2)
where ’ exhibits decreasing returns, 0 < " < 1, and   > 0 is a proportionality
factor. Aggregate human capital, H, is the amount of labor supplied by the two
generations alive in period t. Denoting by ht = n￿ ht the amount of knowledge
in each cohort, aggregate human capital at time t equals Ht = (1 + ‘t)ht. Since







The economy is also endowed at time zero with a stock of natural resources,
R0 > 0. Natural resources are essential for production and are privately owned
by agents. In this regard, we assume a grandfathering process ￿ la Krautkraemer
and Batina (1999): at the beginning of period t, the whole stock of resources
4Mourmouras (1993) uses the overlapping-generations setup to demonstrate that compe-
tition may lead to over-exploitation of privately-owned renewable resources, and describes a
set of conservationist policies that implement the Rawlsian path - i.e. policies that keep pri-
vate welfare constant, at the highest feasible level, across generations. In the same setting,
Krautkraemer and Batina (1999) analyze intergenerational transfers assuming that resource
regeneration rates are stock-dependent, whereas Valente (2007) studies the conditions under
which newborn generations strictly prefer resource-saving policies to laissez-faire conditions.
6Rt is held by adults. Part of Rt is used as natural capital in production, X,
while the remaining stock constitutes resource assets, A. Since the resource is
non-renewable, the resource stock equals Rt = At+Xt in each period, and evolves
over time according to
Rt+1 = Rt ￿ Xt = At: (4)
Adults sell resource assets A at unit price q, and receive a gross marginal rent
p for each unit of natural capital X supplied to ￿rms. Aggregate output, Y , is
produced by means of human and natural capital according to the production
function Yt = X￿
t H
1￿￿
t , with 0 < ￿ < 1. De￿ning k ￿ H=X, the output-natural




It follows from the above assumptions that prospects for sustainability depend not
only on human capital formation, but also on the intergenerational distribution
of entitlements, which a⁄ects the time-path of resource use, and in turn, the
production frontier and consumption possibilities of generations yet to be born.
2.1 Laissez-faire competitive equilibrium
In view of constant returns to scale, the production sector can be represented
as a single competitive ￿rm: denoting by w the wage rate, pro￿t maximization
implies
wt = (1 ￿ ￿)k
￿￿
t and pt = ￿k
1￿￿
t = ￿yt: (6)
As regards consumers, individual budget constraints read
ct = wt‘t￿ ht ￿ qtat; (7)
et+1 = pt+1xt+1 + qt+1at+1 + wt+1￿ ht+1; (8)
where a ￿ A=n and x ￿ X=n are individual amounts of resource assets and nat-
ural capital, respectively. Individual constraints (7)-(8) conveniently summarize
the trade-o⁄ between studying and working faced by young agents: higher study
time yields higher returns from labor in the second period, but lower work time
when young reduces possibilities for ￿rst-period consumption and accumulation
of resource assets. Since the resource market is fully competitive, equilibrium
requires pt = qt at each point in time: using (4), constraint (8) can be written as
et+1 = pt+1rt+1 + wt+1￿ ht+1 = it+1qtat + wt+1￿ ht+1; (9)
where we have de￿ned it+1 as the implicit interest factor on resource assets.
7The consumer problem is solved in two steps. First, agents choose the amount
of work time that maximizes the present value of lifetime income, wt‘t￿ ht +
wt+1￿ ht+1i
￿1
t+1, subject to the learning technology (2). In the second step, con-
sumers maximize lifetime utility (1) subject to the budget constraints (7)-(9).
The resulting ￿rst-order conditions imply
wt+1"’t = wt (1 ￿ ‘t)it+1; (10)
pt+1=pt = qt+1=qt = it+1; (11)
et+1 = ￿ctit+1: (12)
Equation (10) characterizes the optimal allocation of time between studying and
working, and simply asserts that the marginal cost of raising private knowledge
(in terms of labor income that is forgone due to studying) must match its marginal
bene￿t (higher future labor income in present-value terms). Expression (11) is
the Hotelling rule, which asserts that resource assets are e¢ ciently managed over
time if the growth rate of the marginal reward to natural capital equals the rate
of return to private wealth. Equation (12) is the standard Euler condition for
consumption allocation over the life-cycle. Substituting equilibrium prices (6) in
the budget constraints (7)-(9) we obtain the aggregate constraint of the economy,
Yt = Ct + Et; (13)
where Ct = nct and Et = net.
The decentralized equilibrium can be characterized as follows. De￿ne the
natural capital-resource asset ratio as zt ￿ Xt=At. This index is inversely related
to the degree of resource preservation, since the higher is z the lower is the share











(1 ￿ ‘t)(1 + ‘t+1)
"(1 + ‘t)
; (14)
where the ￿rst expression derives from (4), and the second expression is the
equilibrium growth rate of natural capital implied by (10) and (11). From (14),




(1 ￿ ‘t)(1 + ‘t+1)
"(1 + ‘t)
: (15)







￿"‘t ￿ (1 ￿ ‘t)
￿
: (16)
8From (15) and (16), there exists a forward-looking condition determining the
equilibrium value of work time of young agents of the type ‘t+1 = ￿(‘t). Plugging
(16) in (15) to substitute zt and zt+1, and de￿ning parameters
b0 ￿
￿"2 (1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿ + "(￿ + ￿)
> 0 and b1 ￿
(1 ￿ ")(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿"(1 + ￿)
1 ￿ ￿ + "(￿ + ￿)
; (17)
the relation ‘t+1 = ￿(‘t) takes the hyperbolic form






The optimal amount of work time supplied by young generations determines,
together with (3) and (14), the temporary equilibrium of the economy, which
is de￿ned at given expectations over the future interest factor and the future
employment level. Similar models are characterized by stationary solutions, where
work time jumps at the equilibrium level at time zero and is constant thereafter
(see de la Croix and Michel, 2002: Chap.5). Also in the present context, work
time exhibits a stationary solution which is described in the following
Lemma 1 In the decentralized competitive equilibrium, there exists a unique sta-
tionary solution ‘? = ￿(‘?) that satis￿es optimality conditions with positive pro-





1 ￿ b0 + b1 +
q


























￿(‘t) = +1 and lim
‘t!0
￿(‘t) = b1: (22)
Depending on the constellation of parameters, we may have two cases, b1 < 0 or
b1 > 0. In the ￿rst case, b1 < 0, the second limit in (22) implies that there exists
9a unique stationary equilibrium ‘ss such that ‘ss = ￿(‘ss) > 0. Moreover, the
condition ‘ss = ￿(‘ss) implies
b0
1 ￿ ‘ss =
‘ss ￿ b1
‘ss > 1: (23)














which proves that ‘ss is unstable. As a consequence, ‘ss = ‘? as de￿ned in
(19): work time of young agents jumps at ‘? at time zero and remains constant
thereafter (see Figure 1.a). In the second case, b1 > 0, there are two stationary
solutions with positive work time: setting ‘t+1 = ‘t in (18) yields two roots,
‘ss
1 and ‘ss
2 (see Figure 1.b). The ￿rst is given by the right hand side of (19),
and satis￿es ‘ss
1 > ‘ss
2 due to the positive sign in front of the square root. As
before, ‘ss
1 is compatible with optimality conditions and positive production. Root
‘ss
2 appears incompatible with positive production instead: since resources are
essential, zt > 0 is strictly required, which implies, from the denominator in
(16), that equilibrium work time must exceed the lower bound (1 + ￿")
￿1. All
numerical substitutions performed, including the set of parameters used in the
various simulations presented, show that this constraint is violated by the second
root, so that ‘ss





1 ￿ b0 + b1 ￿
q
(1 ￿ b0 + b1)
2 ￿ 4b1
￿
< (1 + ￿")
￿1 :
An example is reported in Figure 1.b: even when b1 > 0, the only solution
satisfying optimality conditions is ‘ss
1 = ‘?.
Given that work time equals ‘? in each period, the decentralized economy
follows a balanced growth path from time zero onward. Setting ‘t = ‘? in (16),
the natural capital-resource asset ratio is constant: from (14), the resource stock
is depleted at a constant rate, and the same rate of variation applies to natural
capital and resource assets. Constant work time implies a constant rate of human
capital accumulation in (3), and therefore a constant growth rate of aggregate
output. Denoting by superscript ￿ ?￿the equilibrium values in the competitive
equilibrium, the following proposition holds.
10Figure 1: Examples of stationary solutions for work time in the decentralized
equilibrium. Graph (a): when b1 < 0 there exists a unique equilibrium (￿ = 0:3,
￿ = 0:65, " = 0:6). Graph (b): when b1 > 0 there exists a second solution
‘ss
2 < ‘ss
1 but it violates optimality conditions (￿ = 0:3, ￿ = 0:65, " = 0:3). The
other solution thus represents the equilibrium.
Proposition 2 The decentralized competitive equilibrium exhibits balanced growth





































where the rate of resource use is linked to study time by
1




Recalling that z? represents the net rate of decline in X?
t , the equilibrium
relation (27) implies that study time is positively correlated with both knowl-
edge accumulation and the speed at which natural capital is being exploited.



















Expression (28) clari￿es that a ceteris paribus increase in ‘? - e.g. induced by
variations in the time-preference rate ￿ - raises the economy￿ s growth rate not
11only by stimulating human capital accumulation (direct e⁄ect), but also limiting
the rate of depletion of natural capital (indirect e⁄ect). Indeed, the higher is
study time, the more natural resources are substituted in production by human
capital; consequently, adult agents sell a higher share of the current stock to
future generations in the form of resource assets - and, symmetrically, a lower
share to ￿rms for production purposes.5 The underlying mechanism may thus be
labelled as crowding-out, although it is a type of crowding-out that is bene￿cial
to growth: human capital complements resource preservation, and both help
sustaining economic growth.
Expression (26) implies that the propensities to consume remain constant over
time: plugging this result in preferences (1), it derives that lifetime-utility lev-
els V ?
t are linear in the logarithm of output at time t - see (53) below. As a
consequence, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for sustainability in the decen-
tralized equilibrium is that Y ?
t+1=Y ?
t ￿ 1. Notice that, under laissez-faire, negative
growth rates are not a remote possibility, since sel￿sh behavior harms prospects
for sustainability to a great extent. In section 3, we will analyze the situations in
which the laissez-faire economy displays unsustainability, characterizing the set
of policies that implement optimal and sustainable paths.
2.2 Utilitarian Command Optimum
The distinctive feature of the Lucas-Uzawa framework is that endogenous growth
is driven by an intergenerational externality. Dynamic knowledge spillovers make
the laissez-faire path sub-optimal from the point of view of discounted utilitari-
anism, and thus provide a rationale for policies that modify the rate of human
capital accumulation (Azariadis and Drazen, 1990; Docquier and Michel, 1999).
In the presence of natural resources, however, implementing the utilitarian so-
lution likely bears side-e⁄ects on the rate of resource extraction, since we may
expect an interaction between human and natural inputs similar to that arising
in the laissez-faire economy. Assume that a benevolent social planner is able to
choose the sequence of consumption levels, work time and resource extraction.
5This result follows from the fact that agents simultaneously satisfy two conditions that
prevent intertemporal arbitrage (over natural and human capital, respectively). To see this



















from which the growth rate of k?
t can be written ratio in terms of parameters and equilibrium
study-time. Subsituting (24) and (25) yields (26).
12The social problem consists of maximizing the discounted sum of lifetime utilities
1 X
t=0
[log(Ct) + ￿ log(Et+1)]￿
t; (29)
where ￿ 2 (0;1) is the social discount factor. The objective function (29) is
utilitarian in spirit, and is deliberately chosen in order to strengthen the idea
that sustainable paths can be a by-product of optimal policies even though the
social goal does not incorporate speci￿c concerns. The utilitarian optimum is






t=0 that maximizes (29) subject to the learning
technology (3), the natural resource constraint (4), and the aggregate constraint
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t, are dynamic multipliers representing the social marginal
shadow values of income, knowledge formation and resource depletion, respec-
tively. The necessary conditions for optimality are
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together with the usual transversality conditions for the co-state variables, ht
and Rt. On the basis of these conditions, denoting by superscript ￿ u￿the optimal


































The amount of work time ‘u can be derived as follows. First, note that (30) and
(31) imply constant propensities to consume, Ct=Yt = ￿(￿ + ￿)
￿1 and Et=Yt =
13￿ (￿ + ￿)
￿1. Substituting these expressions in (36) gives Xt+1=Xt = ￿. By







Hence, the lower is the social discount rate, the higher is study time, 1 ￿ ‘u,
and the lower is the rate of resource depletion. Substituting (40) in conditions
(36)-(39) we obtain the following
Proposition 3 The utilitarian solution exhibits balanced growth equilibrium from





































where the rate of resource use is linked to study time by
z






Expression (44) shows that, similarly to the laissez-faire case, the rate of
resource use is negatively correlated with study time. However, the nature and
consequences of this interaction are quite di⁄erent. From (40) and (43), output






















From (45), a reduction in ￿ increases the optimal growth rate through two chan-
nels: lower discount rates increase optimal study time - which stimulates human
capital accumulation - but also imply slower rates of optimal depletion, because
the weight that is put on the utility of late-in-time generations is higher. This
interaction between human and natural capital can be interpreted in terms of
policy objectives. If public authorities want to implement the utilitarian allo-
cation in a decentralized competitive economy, the task of economic policy is
twofold: ￿rst, it is necessary to support an optimal level of study time,1 ￿ ‘u, in
order to internalize knowledge spillovers; second, parallel actions must be taken
to redistribute resource entitlements across generations, in order to implement
14the optimal rate of resource depletion. Knowledge formation and resource preser-
vation are thus complementary targets. In the next section we exploit (45) to
characterize utilitarian solutions - and, by extension, optimal policies - in both
regards.
3 Growth, Fairness and Social Discounting
The analysis of section 2.2 suggests that optimal policies - i.e. public actions
aimed at implementing the command-optimum allocation in a decentralized econ-
omy - exhibit di⁄erent properties depending on the assumed social discount rate.
This allows us to characterize optimal policies in a consequentialist way, i.e. not
in terms of speci￿c ￿scal instruments, but rather in terms of the consequences for
equilibrium study time and the speed of depletion of natural capital.
3.1 Characterization of optimal policies
For expositional clarity, we will exploit the following de￿nitions. First, if utili-
tarian solutions exhibit slower resource depletion than laissez-faire, implementing
the social optimum requires an intertemporal redistribution of entitlements that
is labelled R-preserving policy. Second, if they exhibit higher study time, the op-
timal allocation is associated with H-enhancing policies. Third, if the utilitarian
solution features a positive net growth rate of output, the optimal allocation is
characterized by sustainability. These situations can be represented in terms of
di⁄erent values of the social discount rate. By de￿nition, R-preserving policies




1 ￿ ‘? ￿ 1: (46)
When (46) does not hold because ￿ > z?, optimal policies are R-depleting. In the
special case ￿ = z?, policies are R-neutral.
As regards H-enhancing policies, it derives from (40) that optimal study time
is higher than laissez-faire study time if
￿ < ^ ￿ ￿
"
1 ￿ ‘? (1 + ‘
?); (47)
where we have de￿ned the upper-bound for H-enhancing policies as ^ ￿. It derives
from (46) and (47) that z? < ^ ￿. This means that R-preserving optimal policies are
necessarily H-enhancing, but the converse is not true. That is, optimal policies
generally raise study time with respect to laissez-faire - in line with the established
15result that improving knowledge formation is desirable - but may not reduce the
rate of resource depletion: when z? < ￿ < ^ ￿, both study time and depletion rates
will exceed the respective laissez-faire values.
In order to assess the consequences of R-preserving and R-depleting policies
for growth and intergenerational fairness, we also characterize sustainability out-
comes. In the utilitarian solution, sustainability requires Y u
t+1=Y u












B (￿) = 1 + ￿; (48)
it derives from (45) that Y u
t+1=Y u
t ￿ 1 is satis￿ed if and only if gA (￿) ￿ gB (￿).
Since gA (:) is monotonically decreasing and gB (:) is monotonically increasing, if
gA (0) > gB (0) = 1 the ￿ sustainability set￿is non-empty, and there is a unique
￿ ￿ satisfying gA (￿ ￿) = gB (￿ ￿). This threshold level represents the critical upper-
bound for the social discount rate to allow for sustained output and welfare in
the social optimum. As a consequence, the utilitarian solution implies an optimal
and sustainable path if
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿: (49)
Since condition (49) imposes another upper-bound on the social discount rate,
sustainability is more likely to arise when ￿ is relatively low - in particular, when
optimal policies are R-preserving. However, since the threshold level ￿ ￿ may be
greater or less than z?, there generally exists the possibility that also R-preserving
optimal policies guarantee sustainable and optimal paths. In the next section, we
describe the implications of R-preserving versus R-depleting policies for growth
rates, output levels, and intergenerational fairness.
3.2 The welfare-compensation mechanism
As noted in section 2.1, negative growth is not a remote possibility under laissez-
faire, since sel￿sh behavior crucially harms prospects for sustainability. Having
characterized utilitarian allocations, of particular interest is the situation in which
parameters imply the laissez-faire economy be unsustainable. Figure 2 reports
two cases in which the laissez-faire equilibrium implies declining output and wel-
fare over time. As expected, sustainable and optimal paths require H-enhancing
optimal policies in both cases (￿ ￿ < ^ ￿). Moreover, in graph (a), sustainability
6As in the laissez-faire case, balanced growth in the social optimum implies lifetime utility
V u
t be linear in the logarithm of output levels at time t - see expression (54) - so that a necessary
and su¢ cient condition for sustainability in the social optimum is Y u
t+1=Y u
t ￿ 1.
16Figure 2: Characterization of optimal policies. The sustainability threshold ￿ ￿ is
obtained using the condition gA = gB, as explained in (48). Graph (a): parame-
ters are ￿ = 0:2, " = 0:02, ￿ = 0:55,   = 1:4. Sustainable optimal paths requires
H-ehnancing and R-preserving policies. Graph (b) parameters are ￿ = 0:2,
" = 0:03, ￿ = 0:75,   = 1:62. Sustainability requires H-ehnancing policies, but
not necessarily R-preserving policies.
requires the optimal policy be both H-enhancing and R-preserving: since ￿ ￿ < z?,
sustainable and optimal paths arise only if study time is increased and deple-
tion rates are reduced. In graph (b), instead, sustainable policies may also be
R-depleting: if the social discount rate falls within the critical range, z? < ￿ < ￿ ￿,
optimal policies raise study time as well as resource use with respect to laissez-
faire.
The consequences of R-depleting and R-preserving policies clearly di⁄er in
terms of growth e⁄ects, level e⁄ects, and intergenerational welfare. Recalling
(45), low discount rates guarantee stronger growth e⁄ects. Level e⁄ects go in the
opposite direction: iterating (24) and (25) with constant ‘ and z yields






































Setting t = 0 we obtain @Y0=@‘ > 0 and @Y0=@z > 0, which implies unambigu-
17ously negative level e⁄ects of reduced discount rates.7
The above reasoning suggests that low discount rates - i.e. more intense R-
preserving optimal policies - generate level e⁄ects that tend to reduce bene￿ts
for early-in-time generations. Expression (52) shows that this is obviously true
in terms of output, and one would expect that the same process a⁄ects welfare
levels. In the latter regard, however, results are not so intuitive, and this is
a peculiar consequence of assuming overlapping generations. As shown below,
R-depleting optimal policies may delay the achievement of welfare gains sub-
stantially, whereas R-preserving optimal policies yield positive net bene￿ts for
early-in-time generations.
Since agents consume output in di⁄erent periods, level-e⁄ects on Y are quite
di⁄erent from level-e⁄ects on lifetime utility, V : from the optimality conditions














u) + (1 + ￿)logY
u
t : (54)
The presence of both ‘ and z in intercept-terms, z0 and z00, elucidates the fact
that positive growth e⁄ects on output yield further level e⁄ects on welfare. For
example, if we implement growth-enhancing policies, reduced ￿rst-period con-
sumption tends to be compensated, at least in part, by increased second-period
consumption. This ￿ welfare-compensation mechanism￿is generally not observ-
able in standard models with in￿nitely-lived consumers. The general implication
is that policies that induce strong growth e⁄ects contrast the negative level ef-
fects generated by redistribution in the long run. This may imply positive welfare
gains already for the ￿rst newborn generation: when optimal output is initially
below the laissez-faire level, Y u
0 < Y ?
0 , but growth e⁄ects imply Y u
1 > Y ?
1 , we can
obtain a strictly positive net e⁄ect on welfare, V u
0 > V ?
0 . This mechanism also
generates an apparently counter-intuitive result: since the intensity of growth
e⁄ects is inversely related with social discount rates, heavy social discounting de-
lays the achievement of (lifetime) utility gains, whereas moderate discount rates
anticipate the achievement of welfare improvements. In particular, more intense
R-preserving policies are more likely to make early-in-time generations better o⁄
with respect to laissez-faire conditions.
Figure 3 and Table 1 illustrate this result in graphical and numerical terms.
In Cases I and II, utilitarian allocations imply lower output levels (relative to
laissez-faire) in the very short run, but the net e⁄ect on lifetime welfare of the ￿rst
7Notice that expression (52) is also valid under laissez-faire: output levels associated with
higher equilibrium study time tend to be lower in the short run.
18newborn generation is strictly positive, even for very high rates of social discount.
The fact that cohorts born at t = 0 represent the ￿ ￿rst happy generation￿may
seem striking but is not bizarre: as Gale (1973) ￿rst pointed out, intergenerational
redistribution can make all agents born at t ￿ 0 better o⁄, provided that those
who are adult at t = 0 renounce part of their entitlements over existing resources
to the bene￿t of future generations. The same reasoning applies here, since any
utilitarian allocation characterized by some degree of intergenerational concern,
￿ > 0, will make the adult generation at time zero worse o⁄ (see Mourmouras,
1993; Valente, 2007).
The parameters and equilibrium values used in Figure 3 are reported in Table
1, where g ￿ (Yt+1=Yt) ￿ 1 represents the net growth rate of output. Case I
assumes relatively impatient consumers (￿ = 0:55 would correspond to a 3.3%
average time-preference rate over 25 years). In this situation, even a unit social
discount rate (i.e. each generation￿ s welfare is weighted one half with respect to
the previous generation) is compatible with positive growth rates, obtained via
increased study time and reduced depletion rates. In Case II, agents are more
willing to smooth consumption pro￿les (￿ = 0:75), and stronger spillover e⁄ects
(  = 1:62) imply that the laissez-faire economy be closer to stationary output.
Nonetheless, the utilitarian allocation yields strong growth e⁄ects, sustaining the
economy even with heavier social discounting (￿ = 2). As shown in Figure 1, the
￿rst happy generation is that born in t = 0, in both cases.
Case ￿ ￿ ‘? ‘u z? zu   g? gu
I 1.00 0.55 0.99 0.96 2.75 1.00 1.40 -7.6% +8.2%
II 2.00 0.75 0.98 0.95 2.09 2.00 1.62 -0.5% +4.6%
III 2.50 0.75 0.98 0.96 2.09 2.50 1.62 -0.5% +0.6%
Table 1. Parameter and equilibrium values used in Figure 3
Resource-preservation e⁄ects are quite relevant for intergenerational welfare,
since they increase the magnitude of the growth e⁄ects on which the mechanism
of welfare-compensation hinges. Notice that Cases I and II display growth e⁄ects
that hinge on both higher study time and reduced depletion rates (‘u < ‘? and
zu < z?). If we assume higher discount rates, optimal policies are not R-preserving
anymore, and growth e⁄ects are sensibly reduced, as shown in Table 1. In Case
III, parameters are identical to Case II except for the social discount rate: setting
￿ = 2:5 implies that the optimal policy be R-depleting - i.e. study time is higher
than under laissez-faire, but natural capital declines faster (zu < z?). As shown
in Figure 3, gu is still positive, but this is now exclusively due to increased rates
of human capital formation in the social optimum, ‘u < ‘?. The graphs on the
19right show that the welfare-compensation e⁄ect is dramatically reduced: the ￿rst
happy generation becomes that born in t = 3 - i.e. three generations lose their
bene￿ts, with respect to Case II.
3.3 Remarks
Our analysis emphasized the role of interactions between human and natural
capital in resource-dependent economies. Studying these interactions is also rel-
evant from an empirical perspective: in the last decade, a number of studies
addressed the question of whether there is a fundamental relationship between
resource dependence, income levels and output growth rates. Sachs and Warner
(2001) argued that there is a negative relation between resource dependence and
economic development, and labelled it as the ￿ curse of natural resources￿ . The
existence of a resource curse was suggested by the poor growth performance of
many countries that did not escape stagnation, despite great abundance of essen-
tial natural inputs, such as oil. Recent evidence suggests that the ￿ resource curse
hypothesis￿appears satis￿ed in countries where natural abundance is combined
with weak institutions (Brunnschweiler, 2007) and low human capital (Gylfason,
2001). In the latter regard, an intuitive counterexample is represented by Scan-
dinavian economies, where resource abundance did not generate ￿ Dutch-disease
phenomena￿ , but rather contributed to sustain development. Bravo-Ortega and
De Gregorio (2005), and Stijns (2006) suggest that human capital formation has
been a key discriminant between winners and losers: economies where workers
are well-endowed with education and skills did not su⁄er from, but rather ex-
ploited resource abundance. Although this literature is not directly linked to the
speci￿c sustainability problem addressed here, the insights of our analysis appear
consistent with empirical results. In particular, Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio
(2005) analyze data from Scandinavian and Latin American economies, and ￿nd
a signi￿cant ￿ interaction term￿between human capital and resource exploitation.
This supports the idea that knowledge formation favors growth not only through
direct e⁄ects, but also indirectly by reducing the rate of resources depletion. In
our model, laissez-faire interactions crucially hinge on the functioning of intertem-
poral markets for resource assets: extending the analysis to consider alternative
forms of transmission of property rights seems a promising way to obtain further
insights on this point.
Another issue that deserves attention relates to the transition law of human
capital. We have considered human capital as a knowledge stock which can be
increased through study time, without modelling education regimes explicitly.
Including monetary costs of education would represent an interesting extension
20Figure 3: Output and welfare levels under laissez-faire versus utilitarian alloca-
tions. Parameter values are " = 0:02 in case I, and " = 0:05 in cases II and III,
with ￿ = 0:2 in all cases.
21from the perspective of both positive and normative analysis. The literature
on human capital formation shows that educational expenditures have ambigu-
ous e⁄ects on growth: depending on whether the economy favors private rather
than public education systems, ￿nancing human capital formation may generate
crowding-out or crowding-in e⁄ects on private wealth, and therefore positive or
negative in￿ uence on economic growth (Blankenau and Simpson, 2004). As re-
gards normative questions, when education is costly the optimal policy typically
includes public expenditures that tend to raise education levels (Valente, 2005):
the interaction between human capital and resource preservation will be obviously
a⁄ected, but is di¢ cult to say a priori in which direction. Comparing the e⁄ects
of private versus public education regimes thus appears an interesting task for
future research on sustainability issues.
4 Conclusions
The modern literature on sustainability follows two main approaches. Models of
sustained growth emphasize the role of technological feasibility, and study the
conditions for obtaining non-declining consumption in the presence of resource-
augmenting innovations. The parallel literature on sustainable development fo-
cuses on the intertemporal distribution of resources, and study whether e¢ cient
allocation rules are compatible with intergenerational fairness. This paper merges
the two frameworks in an endogenous growth model where human capital drives
economic growth, and exhaustible resources are privately owned by overlapping
generations of sel￿sh agents.
In both laissez-faire equilibria and centrally-planned solutions, the rate of hu-
man capital accumulation is inversely correlated to the speed at which natural
capital is depleted. In a competitive economy, enhanced knowledge formation re-
duces depletion rates by increasing the share of resources that present generations
are willing to sell to successors. In the social optimum, human capital crowds
out natural capital, but this is bene￿cial to growth: implementing utilitarian
allocations implies a shift from unsustainable laissez-faire paths to sustainable
and optimal paths, even for high rates of social discount. Knowledge formation
and resource preservation are complementary targets because policies that raise
study time must also reallocate resource entitlements across generations in or-
der to be optimal. With respect to laissez-faire competitive equilibria, optimal
solutions are generally knowledge-improving, but the rate of resource depletion
may be higher or lower depending on the social discount rate. We have shown
that growth e⁄ects are stronger when policies are resource-preserving, and that
slackening depletion has relevant welfare implications. Due to the assumption of
22overlapping generations, growth e⁄ects on output contrast the negative e⁄ects
of redistribution in the short run. As a consequence, the achievement of wel-
fare gains from optimal policies is delayed by faster depletion and, contrary to
intuition, anticipated by lower social discount rates.
The positive correlation between study time and resource preservation is con-
sistent with available empirical evidence, which suggests that resource-dependent
countries exhibit good (bad) growth performance if natural abundance is (not)
combined with fast growth in human capital. A ￿rst possible extension of the
model relates to the accumulation law of human capital: we have ignored the ef-
fects of education expenditures, which may play an important role in determining
both the size and the direction of crowding-out e⁄ects induced by knowledge ac-
cumulation. Second, the interaction mechanism behind the results hinges on the
functioning of intertemporal markets for resource assets: in this regard, extend-
ing the analysis to consider alternative forms of intergenerational transmission
of property rights seems a promising topic for further research on sustainability
issues.
Appendix
Derivation of (53) and (54)
Substituting the intertemporal condition e?
t+1 = ￿c?
tit+1 in individual prefer-

























(1 + z?), we have
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where we have used ht+1 = ’tht and
wt+1
it+1 = wt
"’t (1 ￿ ‘t). Using (6) and a=X = n=z
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As regards the utilitarian allocation, in the main text we have shown that con-
sumption shares read Ct=Yt = ￿(￿ + ￿)
￿1 and Et=Yt = ￿ (￿ + ￿)
￿1. Using these
results and substituting Y u
t+1 = (1 + zu)
￿￿  
1￿￿ (1 ￿ ‘u)
















+ (1 + ￿)logY
u
t : (56)
Consolidating the ￿rst logarithm in z00 (‘u;zu) yields expression (54) in the text.
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